Raise Your Glass: The Third Circuit Holds New Jersey Wine Laws in Violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Leaves Room for a Future Challenge of the Direct Shipment Ban by Williamson, James J., II
Volume 56 Issue 4 Article 4 
2012 
Raise Your Glass: The Third Circuit Holds New Jersey Wine Laws 
in Violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Leaves Room 
for a Future Challenge of the Direct Shipment Ban 
James J. Williamson II 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James J. Williamson II, Raise Your Glass: The Third Circuit Holds New Jersey Wine Laws in Violation of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and Leaves Room for a Future Challenge of the Direct Shipment Ban, 56 
Vill. L. Rev. 753 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss4/4 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2012]
RAISE YOUR GLASS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS NEW JERSEY
WINE LAWS IN VIOLATION OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND LEAVES ROOM FOR
A FUTURE CHALLENGE OF THE
DIRECT SHIPMENT BAN
JAMES J. WILLIAMSON 11*
"By making this wine vine known to the public, I have rendered my
country as great a service as if I had enabled it to pay back
the national debt."'
I. INTRODUCTION
By the end of an introductory course in constitutional law, any law
student should be able to explain the importance of the Commerce
Clause.2 Far and away, this is the authority by which Congress legislates.3
Unlike the other enumerated powers, however, the Commerce Clause is
* The author would like to thank Professors Tuan Samahon and Todd
Aagaard for their advice and comments during the writing of this Casebrief. That
author would also like to thank Amy Dudash, Frank Monterosso, Derek Hines, and
all of the editorial staff of the Villanova Law Review for their assistance and
diligence throughout the editorial process. This Casebrief would not have been
possible without the tremendous love and support from the author's wife and
children.
1. This quote is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson. However, according to
the Thomas Jefferson Foundation, the quote has never been found in Jefferson's
writings, and it is believed that the statement was in fact made by John Adlum, a
friend ofJefferson's. See Making This Wine Vine Known to the Public (Quotation), post-
ing under Spurious Quotations, MONTICELLO, http://www.monticello.org/site/jef-
ferson/making-wine-vine-known-to-public-quotation (noting Adlum's statement
was actually: "'In bringing this grape into public notice, I have rendered my coun-
try a greater service, than I would have done, had I paid the national debt'" (cita-
tion omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Curricular Stress, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110, 111 (2010)
(stating that constitutional law is usually taught in first year of law school, and
covers structural issues such as separation of powers, federalism, and Commerce
Clause).
3. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 256
(3d ed. 2006) (noting that between 1937 and 1995, Supreme Court did not hold
congressional laws in violation of Commerce Clause). In 1995, however, the Su-
preme Court, in United States v. Lopez, began a process of restricting the scope of
the Commerce Clause by striking down a federal law prohibiting the carrying of a
firearm near school property. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(holding federal firearm ban within 1000 feet of school property in violation of
Commerce Clause); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)
(declaring portion of Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional because gen-
der-related crimes did not constitute "economic activity," and therefore did not
affect interstate commerce).
(753)
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equally as powerful in its "negative" or "dormant" state.' Although not
expressly stated in the text, the reverse of the Constitution's Commerce
Clause prevents states from engaging in economic protectionism. 5
Though this principle is well understood, there remains tremendous con-
fusion among states and courts alike over the regulation of one particular
good: alcohol.6
Since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, alcohol
law has been in a state of flux.' For over eighty years, states and federal
4. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
571 (1997) ("[T]he Commerce Clause [has] not only granted Congress express
authority to override restrictive and conflicting commercial regulations adopted by
the States, but [ ] it also [has] immediately effected a curtailment of state power.").
In his dissent, Justice Thomas notes that although both "negative" and "dormant"
have been used to describe this doctrine, he prefers "negative" for two reasons. See
id. at 609 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining preference for "negative Com-
merce Clause"). First, "'[T]he "negative Commerce Clause" . . . is "negative" not
only because it negates state regulation of commerce, but also because it does not
appear in the Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
Second, Justice Thomas believes "[t]here is, quite frankly, nothing 'dormant'
about [the Court's] jurisprudence in this area." Id. (citation omitted).
5. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (discuss-
ing reason for dormant Commerce Clause). In the opinion of the Court, justice
Jackson summarized the reason for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he
will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embar-
goes will withhold his export, and no foreign state will by customs duties
or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the
free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him
from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has
been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1689, 1705 (1984) ("[T]he dormant commerce clause is aimed primarily at mea-
sures taken out of a desire to improve the economic position of in-staters at the
expense of out-of-staters."). In the following paragraph of his article, Professor
Sunstein explains that the doctrine is aimed at prohibiting state protectionism
under the theory that out-of-staters do not have political recourse to address the
discrimination because they are not citizens of the discriminating state. See id. (ex-
plaining reasons for dormant Commerce Clause). When regulations burden
equally, however, "the political safeguard is more reliable." Id.
6. See Stuart Banner, Granholm v. Heald: A Case of Wine and a Prohibition
Hangover, 2005 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 263, 263 (2005) (citing reason for plethora of
dormant Commerce Clause challenges due to Twenty-first Amendment). Profes-
sor Banner credits the Twenty-first Amendment, and its grant of power to the
states to regulate interstate shipments of alcohol, as the reason for the constant
amount of alcohol litigation. See id. (proffering reason for dormant Commerce
Clause challenges).
7. See id. ("Because states have been aggressive in regulating the liquor busi-
ness over the past seventy years, and because lots of money has been at stake,
courts, including the Supreme Court, have been wrestling with the Twenty-first
Amendment ever since the end of Prohibition."); see also Lisa Lucas, Comment, A
New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment with the Com-
merce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REv. 899, 914-18 (2005) (providing history of Eighteenth
754
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss4/4
CASEBRIEF
courts have struggled to determine how Section Two of the Twenty-first
Amendment-which provides states with the authority to regulate the
shipment of alcohol-interacts with the dormant Commerce Clause.8
Throughout this period, courts, rather than harmonizing the dueling pro-
visions, have simply chosen between them: showing favor for either (1) the
more recently ratified Twenty-first Amendment and states' rights or (2) a
doctrine developed against the backdrop of "Balkanization" that led to the
demise of the Articles of Confederation and ultimately to the drafting of
our Constitution.9 Not an easy choice.
The Supreme Court did its best to bring these two warring constitu-
tional provisions into harmony in Granholm v. Heald.'0 Granholm involved
challenges to the constitutionality of Michigan and New York alcohol
laws." While these laws permitted in-state wineries to sell directly to con-
sumers, they prevented out-of-state wineries from doing the same.1 2 The
Supreme Court not only held that the state laws violated the dormant
Commerce Clause, but further stated that the laws could not be saved by
Amendment, from beginning of "Noble Experiment" to its repeal via ratification
of Twenty-first Amendment).
8. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
9. Seejames Alexander Tanford, E-Comnerce in Wine, 3J.L. EcoN. & POL'Y 275,
279 (2007) (discussing reason for adopting dormant Commerce Clause doctrine:
to avoid pitting states against each other, which had occurred among colonies, and
eventually led to end of Articles of Confederation). Mr. Tanford, in addition to
authoring an interesting article about the current battle over wine and e-com-
merce, which is at the center of the direct shipment ban debate, was also Counsel
of Record for the plaintiffs in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), the Supreme
Court case that provided the precedent upon which the Third Circuit relied when
deciding the case upon which this Casebrief is written. See id. at n.al (describing
Mr. Tanford's background).
10. 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005) ("We hold that the laws in both States discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3, and that the discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by the
Twenty-first Amendment.").
11. See id. at 465 (stating case involved challenge to Michigan and New York
laws).
12. See id. at 465-66 (describing in general terms issue before Court). There
were slight differences between the Michigan direct shipment law and the New
York regulatory scheme. See id. at 466 (noting differences in "details and mechan-
ics of the two regulatory schemes"). Both Michigan and New York used the "three-
tier" regulatory system, which forces alcohol producers (in this case, the wineries)
to sell to wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers, who finally sell the wine to
consumers. See id. at 466-67 (describing how three-tier regulatory system oper-
ates). Michigan allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers as long as
the winery possessed a "wine maker" license, a benefit that was not extended to
out-of-state wineries. See id. at 469 (explaining how Michigan law discriminated
against out-of-state wineries). New York, on the other hand, allowed out-of-state
wineries to "ship directly to New York consumers only if it [became] a licensed
New York winery, which requires the establishment of 'a branch factory, office or
storeroom within the state of New York.'" Id. at 470 (quoting N.Y. ALco. BEv.
CONT. LAw § 3(37), invalidated by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460).
7552012]
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the Twenty-first Amendment.1 3 In the opinion, however, the Court af-
firmed (arguably through dicta) that the alcohol regulatory scheme em-
ployed by a majority of the states-the "three-tier" regulatory system-
remained "unquestionably legitimate" under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.14 It is over this language that the majority of battles between the
dormant Commerce Clause and state regulation of wine continue to be
waged.'1
Since Granholm, nearly every circuit court has issued a ruling applying
the Court's holding, with varying degrees of deference.' 6 In December
2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit finally
weighed in, and issued an opinion in Freeman v. Corzine17 that struck down
certain New Jersey wine laws as unconstitutional.18 The New Jersey laws
allowed in-state wineries to sell directly to consumers and retailers, but
prohibited out-of-state wineries from enjoying the same benefit.19 Not
only did the Third Circuit find those laws in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, but it also extended its holding to the importation and
13. See id. at 493 ("States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or
severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously author-
izing direct shipment by in-state producers.").
14. Id. at 489 ("We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself
is 'unquestionably legitimate."' (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S.
423, 432 (1990))). As discussed in the text, there is debate as to whether the
Court's acknowledgement of the three-tier system in North Dakota, and subse-
quently Granholm, was dicta or part of the holding. See Banner, supra note 6, at 285
(stating that "unquestionably legitimate" language in North Dakota was dicta). But
see Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 816 (5th Cir. 2010) (not-
ing that "unquestionably legitimate" language may be dicta, but if so, it is "compel-
ling dicta").
15. See, e.g., Angela Logomasini, Why Is Congress So Afraid of Mail Order Wine?,
FoxNEWS.COM, Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/09/29/
angela-logomasini-beer-wine-wholesalers-legislation-retailers-wineries/ (noting that
congressional proposals to protect state alcohol laws focus on three-tier system).
16. See, e.g., Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (holding Texas law that allows in-state alcohol
retailers to make local deliveries, but forbids out-of-state retailers from doing same,
does not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571
F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding New York law that allowed in-state alcohol retail-
ers to ship directly to consumers, but prohibited out-of-state retailers from doing
same, was constitutional because all in-state alcohol was still subject to three-tier
system); Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding
Kentucky statutory in-person purchase requirements for authorized direct ship-
ping discriminated against interstate commerce in practical effect); Cherry Hill
Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that Maine statute
that allowed small wineries to bypass wholesalers and sell directly to consumers in
face-to-face transactions did not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Brooks v. Vas-
sar, 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding personal importation regulations do not
violate dormant Commerce Clause).
17. 629 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2010).
18. See id. at 164-65 (holding that direct sales provisions of New Jersey law
violate dormant Commerce Clause).
19. See id. at 151-52 (discussing alleged discrimination of NewJersey wine laws
as claimed by plaintiffs).
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reciprocity restrictions, and left the door open for a challenge to New
Jersey's direct shipment ban.2 0 While this decision not only appears to
benefit wine lovers, it is a break from competing circuit court analysis find-
ing such regulations to be lawful.2 1
This Casebrief argues that the Third Circuit's recent treatment of the
dormant Commerce Clause with respect to alcohol laws not only is consis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent, but, by reaffirming that the Twenty-
first Amendment does not immunize states from economic protectionism,
has established an environment that will allow future challenges to out-
standing alcohol laws via the dormant Commerce Clause. Part II of this
Casebrief discusses how other circuits have treated the dormant Com-
merce Clause with respect to alcohol laws in the wake of the Granholm
decision.22 Part III examines the Third Circuit's opinion in Freeman.23
Part IV analyzes the court's reasoning and identifies areas upon which fu-
ture litigators should focus in order to challenge or defend forthcoming
lawsuits. 24 Furthermore, it discusses why the Third Circuit "bar" can ex-
pect plenty of patrons as it becomes the forum of choice for wine law
20. See id. (finding importation and reciprocity laws in violation of dormant
Commerce Clause). The court, in conducting its analysis on the direct shipment
ban, noted that the plaintiffs "d[id] not argue in the alternative that the direct
shipping ban fails the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc." Id. at 164 (ex-
plaining that because no argument was made, court does not need to conduct that
analysis). The court also noted that the plaintiffs did not present any evidence that
the NewJersey laws directly burdened interstate commerce. See id. at 162-63 (not-
ing lack of evidence of impact of state alcohol laws on interstate commerce). Had
a Pike argument been made, or evidence on how the state laws impacted interstate
commerce been presented, the court suggested that perhaps their analysis would
have probed a little deeper. See id. (suggesting that several types of evidence could
have been presented to show direct harm on interstate commerce).
21. See, e.g., Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (holding Texas law that allows in-state alcohol
retailers to make local deliveries, but forbids out-of-state retailers from doing same,
does not violate dormant Commerce Clause); see also, Lee Procida, Court to Decide
on N.J Rules/Changes Wony Wineries, PRESS OF ATLANTIC Crry, Feb. 5, 2011, at Al
(discussing bill that would allow for direct shipment of wine to N.J. consumers).
But see Paul Franson, judgment Threatens Consumer-Direct Wine Sales, WINES & VINES
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.winesandvines.com/template.cfm?section=news&
content=82219# (discussing possible ramifications of Freeman v. Corzine deci-
sion). In the article, Cary Greene, chief operating officer and general counsel of
WineAmerica, speculates that the decision could lead to the closing of New Jersey
wine tasting rooms. See id. (discussing possibilities for remedy on remand).
22. For a discussion of how other circuits have applied the Granholm v. Heald
holding, see infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
23. For a summary of the Freeman v. Corzine decision, see infra notes 76-119
and accompanying text.
24. For a critical analysis of the Freeman v. Corine decision, see infra notes 125-
37 and accompanying text. For a discussion as to where future litigation should
focus to challenge or defend other state alcohol laws, and the importance behind
how the court resolved the prudential standing issue, see infra notes 138-53 and
accompanying text.
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challenges. Finally, Part V closes by addressing the possible remedies that
await New Jersey wineries. 25
II. A COMPLICATED PAIRING: WINE AND THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Following the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, courts were
left with the arduous task of defining its limits. 26 For years, post-ratifica-
tion Supreme Court opinions focused mainly on import excise taxes and
licensing fees. 27 Thanks to the Internet's explosive impact on the wine
market in the late-twentieth century, the Court acknowledged the need to
address the wine shipment debate.28 This Part first discusses the Court's
Granholm decision.29 Then, it addresses the treatment of that decision in
the hands of the circuit courts."0
A. The Supreme Court and Granholm
When applying the dormant Commerce Clause to wine law chal-
lenges, circuit courts generally rely upon a single Supreme Court case as
precedent: Granholm v. Heald.3 1 Granholm, however, is not the only Su-
preme Court case that serves as relevant authority for wine law discus-
25. For a discussion of the possible remedies upon remand, see infra notes
154-57 and accompanying text.
26. See generally,Jessica R. Reese, Note, A Post-Granholm Analysis of Iowa's Regu-
latory Framework for Wine Distribution, 94 IowA L. REv. 665, 673-76 (2009) (discussing
post Twenty-first Amendment ratification jurisprudence).
27. See Banner, supra note 6, at 279-82 (discussing post-Twenty-first Amend-
ment ratification Supreme Court decisions).
28. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS To E-Com-
MERCE: WINE 3-9 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.
pdf (discussing effect of state wine laws on wine commerce via internet). This is
the primary factual study upon which the Granholm Court relied throughout its
opinion. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005) (citing FTC report on
wine e-commerce industry); see also Desired C. Slaybaugh, Note, A Twisted Vine: The
Aftermath of Granholm v. Heald, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 265, 267-69 (2011) (dis-
cussing impact of e-commerce on wine industry).
29. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Granholm v. Heald, see
infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the application of the Granholm decision by the circuit
courts, with examples of how the circuits have held state liquor laws to both survive
and fail dormant Commerce Clause challenges, see infra notes 48-75 and accompa-
nying text.
31. See Jonathan M. Rotter & Joshua S. Stambaugh, What's Left of the Twenty-
first Amendment?, 6 CARDOzo PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHIcsJ. 601, 627 (2008) (discussing
application of Granholm v. Heald by circuit courts). Interestingly, in their discus-
sion of the Granholm decision by lower courts, the authors predict that "[t] he re-
quirement of 'equal access' for out-of-state liquor producers may, when fully
developed, outlaw a number of practices initially thought to survive Granholm." See
id. (predicting expansion of Granholm holding by lower courts).
[Vol. 56: p. 753758
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sions.3 2 North Dakota v. United States,3 3 a case that involved a Supremacy
Clause challenge-not a dormant Commerce Clause challenge-provides
the oft-quoted language that the three-tier alcohol regulatory system is
"unquestionably legitimate."34 Lesser known circuit opinions also occa-
sionally appear in court decisions; still, Granholm remains the primary au-
thority upon which lower courts rely, due to its treatment of the dormant
Commerce Clause with respect to three-tier alcohol regulatory systems.35
The majority of states employ a three-tier system for regulating and
accounting for the sale of alcohol.3 6 Under such a system, alcohol pro-
32. See generally Todd Zywicki & Asheesh Agarwal, Wine, Commerce, and the Con-
stitution, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 609, 63945 (2005) (discussing Supreme Court
precedent of dormant Commerce Clause and alcohol laws post-Prohibition).
In their discussion of Supreme Court precedent following the repeal of the
Eighteenth Amendment, the authors note that early opinions did uphold facially
discriminatory state liquor laws. See id. at 640 (discussing early decisions, all based
upon reasoning set forth in first among such cases: Bd. of Equalization of Califor-
nia v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936)). Those early opinions, however, have
very little precedential value as subsequent Supreme Court opinions have rejected
those holdings. See id. (citing United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293
(1945), for upholding federal liquor laws and rejecting argument that Twenty-first
Amendment gave states complete control over liquor). In 1984, the Supreme
Court decided Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, which applied "standard Commerce
Clause principles to discriminatory regulation of alcohol" to find Hawaii liquor
laws in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 641 (referring to
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1984)). The Court then af-
firmed its dormant Commerce Clause analysis in Healy v. Beer Institute, which found
a Connecticut law requiring out-of-state beer shippers to assure that their beer
prices were not higher than border-state beer prices violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 641-42 (discussing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S 324
(1989)).
33. 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
34. See id. at 426 (plurality opinion) ("The clash between the State's interest
in preventing the diversion of liquor and the federal interest in obtaining the low-
est possible price forms the basis for the Federal Government's Supremacy Clause
and pre-emption challenges to the North Dakota regulations."). In addressing the
three-tier system, which North Dakota employed, in relation to the Twenty-first
Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote:
The two North Dakota regulations fall within the core of the State's
power under the Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of promoting
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue,
the State has established a comprehensive system for the distribution of
liquor within its borders. That system is unquestionably legitimate.
Id. at 432 (citations omitted) (describing three-tier system as "unquestionably
legitimate").
35. See, e.g., Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2010) (invok-
ing Granholm holding as controlling). For a discussion of the three-tier system, see
infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
36. See Christopher G. Sparks, Comment, Out-of-State Wine Retailers Corked: How
the Illinois General Assembly Limits Direct Wine Shipments from Out-of-State Retailers to
Illinois Oenophiles and Why the Commerce Clause Will Not Protect Them, 30 N. ILL. U. L.
Rxv. 481, 486 (2010) (stating that most states moved to three-tier system of regula-
tion after ratification of Twenty-first Amendment). For an interesting discussion of
the history of the three-tier system, see Tanford, supra note 9, at 302-03 (discussing
purpose and history behind three-tier regulatory system).
2012] CASEBRIEF 759
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ducers sell to wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers, who finally sell to
consumers.3 7 This system violates the dormant Commerce Clause when
in-state entities are afforded opportunities to bypass some or all of this
three-tier system (i.e., avoiding a wholesaler), but out-of-state entities are
not.38
This was precisely the issue in Granholm.39 In Granholm, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a regulatory scheme that permit-
ted in-state wineries (producers) to ship directly to consumers, but re-
stricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do the same, violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.40 The Court held the scheme unconstitu-
tional.4 1 The Court reiterated its position that the Twenty-first Amend-
ment gave states a great amount of power to regulate the sale of alcohol,
but emphasized that such power "does not allow States to ban, or severely
limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously author-
izing direct shipment by in-state producers."4 2 The Court proclaimed that
if a state chose to allow an in-state winery to ship wine directly to a cus-
tomer, then out-of-state wineries must be afforded the same leniency. 43 A
regulation allowing otherwise would run directly against the dormant
Commerce Clause because it "'benefits the former and burdens the
latter.' "44
37. See Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing three-tier system). The court in Arnold's Wines states that the purpose
of the three-tier system "was to preclude the existence of a 'tied' system between
producers and retailers, a system generally believed to enable organized crime to
dominate the industry." Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 36, at 486 (describing three-
tier regulatory process). Within the three-tier regulatory system it is generally pro-
hibited for an entity to hold more than one position in the hierarchy-something
known as "vertical integration." See Sparks, supra note 36, at 486 (discussing prohi-
bition on vertical integration).
38. See Tanford, supra note 9, at 320 (discussing Granholm holding that pro-
hibited states from discriminating against out-of-state wineries).
39. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005) ("[T]he object and ef-
fect of the laws are the same: to allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to con-
sumers in that State but to prohibit out-of-state wineries from doing so, or, at the
least, to make direct sales impractical from an economic standpoint.").
40. See id. at 471 (posing issue before Court). The Supreme Court's direct
view of the issue was: "Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state winer-
ies directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state win-
eries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment?" Id. at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 466 ("We hold that the laws in both States discriminate against
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, and that the discrimina-
tion is neither authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment." (cita-
tion omitted)).
42. See id. at 493 (discussing why Michigan and New York laws were found to
have violated dormant Commerce Clause).
43. See id. ("If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so
on evenhanded terms.").
44. Id. at 472 (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality
of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
760 [Vol. 56: p. 753
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Although the states involved (New York and Michigan) made argu-
ments supporting their laws-namely, to curb underage drinking and ac-
count for tax revenues-the Court found them largely speculative and
unpersuasive.45 The Court determined that it would uphold state regula-
tions that discriminate against interstate commerce "only after finding,
based on concrete record evidence, that a State's nondiscriminatory alter-
natives will prove unworkable."4 6 Otherwise, such regulations are viewed
as per se invalid because they contribute to the exact environment that the
Framers wished to avoid through the Commerce Clause: economic
Balkanization.4 7
B. Granholm in the Hands of the Circuit Courts
In the wake of the Granholm decision, many states immediately
changed their alcohol laws to avoid legal challenges.48 Given the choice
between extending benefits enjoyed by in-state wineries to out-of-state win-
eries, or limiting the benefits of both entities, the states with discrimina-
tory laws unanimously chose to extend benefits to their out-of-state
counterparts. 49 Because Granholm's holding technically applied only to
"producers," leaving two of the three tiers untouched (wholesalers and
retailers), states quickly carved out new benefits that extended only to in-
state wholesalers or retailers.50 Over the past five years, the question of
45. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489-93 (finding states' arguments for discrimina-
tion in interstate commerce unpersuasive). The states made two primary argu-
ments for the discriminatory laws: first, the laws allowed the states to police
underage drinking; second, the laws facilitated tax collection. See id. at 489 (not-
ing states' arguments). The Court found that the evidence the states presented
did not show that direct shipping increased alcohol consumption by minors. See
id. at 490 (noting that lack of evidence left only unsupported assertions). Further-
more, the Court found that the states' tax concerns could be "achieved without
discriminating against interstate commerce" through the employment of other
nondiscriminatory means, as suggested through the Model Direct Shipping Bill.
Id. at 491 (noting other regulatory schemes available for tax collection purposes).
46. Id. at 493 (citation omitted) (describing conditions needed to allow laws
that discriminate against interstate commerce).
47. See id. at 476 (acknowledging presumption of invalidity for laws that dis-
criminate against interstate commerce (citing Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978))); see also id. at 472 (noting that Framers called Constitutional
Convention to address issue of economic Balkanization between colonies).
48. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-
Granholm Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition,
75 ANTITRUsT L.J. 505, 505 (2008) (discussing reaction of states with respect to
discriminatory laws following Granholm).
49. See id. ("After the Granholm decision, states with discriminatory laws on
their books had to make a choice: they could either 'level up' by extending direct-
shipping privileges to out-of-state wineries, or 'level down' by revoking such privi-
leges from in-state wineries.").
50. See id. (discussing new restrictions placed on out-of-state entities by states);
see also id. at 521 ("Defendants [of the Twenty-first Amendment] have further ar-
gued that Granholm applies only to regulations pertaining to wine producers and
products-not to regulations that pertain to wholesalers and retailers.").
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how far the Granholm holding extends has been left to the circuit courts,
with no clear answer emerging.5'
1. A Glass Half Full: Circuit Court Decisions Upholding a Dormant Commerce
Clause Challenge
The Sixth Circuit, in Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 5 2 faced the
question of whether Kentucky statutes that allowed wineries to ship di-
rectly to customers, so long as the customers physically made the purchase
at the winery (the "in-person purchase requirement"), offended the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.5 3 Although the in-person purchase requirement
was not facially discriminatory-out-of-state wineries were afforded the
same opportunity for direct shipment as long as the wine was purchased at
the out-of-state premises-the court held that the statute discriminated in
practical effect.5 4 The requirement that wine be purchased from the phys-
ical premises of the winery favored Kentucky wineries because of the
shorter travel times experienced by in-state customers. 5 5 It also burdened
out-of-state wineries by forcing them to sell their product through whole-
salers, which increased the cost of the wine, making it less attainable for
the consumer.5 6 Because the state failed to show how the law advanced a
legitimate local purpose that could not be achieved through other nondis-
51. See Banner, supra note 6, at 285 (discussing range of possible lawsuits that
would arise after Granholm decision). Although the author wrote the article in the
immediate aftermath of Granholm, the author forecasted what the courts could
expect by stating:
We should thus in the short run expect to see challenges brought by out-
of-state wholesalers seeking to sell to in-state retailers and consumers, by
out-of-state retailers seeking to sell to in-state consumers, by in-state retail-
ers seeking to buy directly from out-of-state producers, and from consum-
ers seeking to buy from anyone, anywhere.
Id. As this Casebrief will show, Professor Banner correctly forecasted the legal
storm that followed Granholm.
52. 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
53. See id. at 432 ("[T]he threshold question is whether the in-person
purchase requirements of KRS §§ 243.155 and 244.165 are discriminatory.").
54. See id. at 433 (concluding that plaintiffs proved statute discriminated in
practical effect). The court points out that even if a statute does not facially dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, it may still be found to discriminate in
practical effect. See id. (providing that statutes may discriminate against interstate
commerce even if facially neutral). For a court to hold a statute as discriminatory
in practical effect, it must be shown "'both how local economic actors are favored
by the legislation, and how out-of-state actors are burdened by the legislation.'" Id.
(quoting E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin Cnty., 127 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir.
1997)).
55. See id. at 433 ("[S]mall Kentucky wineries benefit from less competition
from out-of-state wineries, especially from wineries in states such as Oregon, which
are located a great distance from Kentucky . ... ).
56. See id. (discussing effect on cost by funneling wine through wholesaler).
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criminatory means, the laws were deemed unconstitutional in violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause.5 7
Following the Lilly decision, the First Circuit, in Family Winemakers of
California v. Jenkins,58 held a Massachusetts law in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause because it allowed "small wineries"-a term that sub-
sumed all Massachusetts wineries-to ship directly to customers, but pro-
hibited "large wineries" from doing the same.59 Like the court in Lilly, the
First Circuit found that the law discriminated in its practical effect.6 0 The
court determined that the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause be-
cause it "change[d] the competitive balance between in-state and out-of-
state wineries" in a way that benefited the former and burdened the lat-
ter.61 Furthermore, the court dismissed an argument that the law was con-
stitutional because of the Twenty-first Amendment, noting that the
amendment does not protect "facially neutral but discriminatory" alcohol
laws. 6 2
2. A Glass Half Empty: Using "Unquestionably Legitimate" Reasoning to Ward
Off the Commerce Clause
Not all circuit courts have been willing to extend their dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis as far as some wine law challengers would like.6 3
57. See id. at 434 (" [W]e conclude that Kentucky's in-person purchase require-
ment, which is discriminatory in practical effect, violates the dormant Commerce
Clause."). The state did make arguments that the laws were necessary to limit un-
derage drinking and account for tax revenue, similar to the arguments made in
Granholm. See id. at 434 (arguing why laws are necessary to advance legitimate local
purpose). The court, like the Supreme Court did, found them unpersuasive. See
id. (noting that arguments by state and wholesalers were unpersuasive).
58. 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
59. See id. at 4-5 (discussing issue before court and holding it in violation of
Commerce Clause).
60. See id. at 12 ("The ultimate effect of [the law] is to artificially limit the
playing field in this market in a way that enables Massachusetts's wineries to gain
market share against their out-of-state competitors."). The court offers a good
summation of what makes a law discriminatory in its effect by stating, "A state law is
discriminatory in effect when, in practice, it affects similarly situated entities in a
market by imposing disproportionate burdens on out-of-state interests and confer-
ring advantages upon in-state interests." Id. at 10 (citations omitted) (describing
effectual discrimination).
61. Id. at 5 (describing circumstances law created that made it
unconstitutional).
62. Id. (stating that Twenty-first Amendment does not save discriminatory
state alcohol laws from unconstitutionality).
63. See, e.g., Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding small winery and in-person purchase exceptions to three-tier system did
not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Jelovsek v. Bredesen, 545 F.3d 431 (6th
Cir. 2008) (holding ban on direct shipment of alcohol to consumers did not vio-
late dormant Commerce Clause); Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d
28 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding Maine statute that allowed in-state wineries to bypass
wholesalers and sell directly to consumers in face-to-face transactions, but which
prohibited direct shipping, did not violate dormant Commerce Clause).
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For instance, the Fourth Circuit, in Brooks v. Vassar,64 ruled that a Virginia
law providing for a personal import exception, which limited the amount
of alcohol a person could bring into the state to one gallon, did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause.65 The court's analysis focused on the
law's treatment of the three-tier system. 66 Because Virginia wanted to en-
sure that all alcohol passed through its "unquestionably legitimate" three-
tier system, the court determined that the law was not only nondiscrimina-
tory, but in fact favored out-of-state alcohol because it allowed one gallon
of imported wine to skirt the three-tier system.6 1 Other circuit courts have
upheld similar laws in the face of a Commerce Clause challenge through
parallel reasoning.68
The most recent, and perhaps most significant circuit court decision
with respect to Freeman v. Conine, is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wine
64. 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006).
65. See id. at 344-45 (summarizing court's holding).
66. See id. at 352 ("[A]n argument that compares the status of an in-state re-
tailer with an out-of-state retailer-or that compares the status of any other in-state
entity under the three-tier system with its out-of-state counterpart-is nothing dif-
ferent than an argument challenging the three-tier system itself.").
67. See id. (noting that importation restriction allows out-of-state alcohol to
circumvent three-tier system, and thus is not discriminatory); see also Rotter &
Stambaugh, supra note 31, at 628-30 (commenting on court's analysis in Vassar).
The article provides a lengthy analysis of the dissenting opinion in Vassar, noting
that under the dissent's interpretation of Granholm, the law would have violated
the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 630 (noting that dissent would not have
found law to advance legitimate local purpose).
68. See, e.g., Arnold's Wine, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
New York statute prohibiting out-of-state retailers from shipping directly to con-
sumers as constitutional).
The statute at issue in Arnold's Wines allowed in-state retailers to deliver alco-
hol directly to consumers, but prohibited out-of-state retailers from doing the
same. See id. at 188 ("It is this distinction-that New York-licensed retailers, but
not out-of-state retailers, may deliver liquor directly to New York residents-that
Appellants challenge in this case."). The court found that the law was not discrimi-
natory because, under the "unquestionably legitimate" three-tier system, all alco-
hol, whether in- or out-of-state, was required to pass through New York's regulatory
scheme. See id. at 191 ("New York's ABC Law treats in-state and out-of-state liquor
evenhandedly under the state's three-tier system, and thus complies with
Granholm's nondiscrimination principle." (citation omitted)); see also Sparks, supra
note 36, at 496 (discussing Second Circuit's reliance on "unquestionably legiti-
mate" three-tier regulatory system).
Because New York treated all alcohol equally, the court held the law to be
constitutional. See Arnold's Wines, 571 F.3d at 186 (holding challenged statute as
constitutional as long as all liquor sold passes through three-tier system). There-
fore, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to analyze the law under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. See id. at 191 ("Because New York's three-tier system
treats in-state and out-of-state liquor the same, and does not discriminate against
out-of-state products or producers, we need not analyze the regulation further
under Commerce Clause principles."). But see Andre Nance, Note, Don't Put a Cork
in Granholm v. Heald: New York's Ban on Interstate Direct Shipments of Wine is Uncon-
stitutional, 16J.L. & POL'Y 925, 933 (2008) (arguing against Second Circuit's hold-
ing in Arnold's Wine).
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Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen.6 9 In Steen, the Fifth Circuit held a Texas
law that allowed in-state retailers to make local deliveries to customers, but
prevented out-of-state retailers from shipping directly to Texas consumers,
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.70 The court, like the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits, began its discussion by acknowledging that the
three-tier system is "unquestionably legitimate." 7' The court then deter-
mined that the Granholm decision was limited solely to producers, and that
Texas "has not tripped over that bar by allowing in-state retailer deliv-
eries."72 Although the court acknowledged that the dormant Commerce
Clause applied, it stated that it applied differently to alcohol due to the
Twenty-first Amendment.7 3 Finding the local deliveries to be a "constitu-
tionally benign incident of an acceptable three-tier system," the court
ruled in favor of the state's scheme.7 4
The Fifth Circuit's decision followed a string of circuit cases that also
relied on the "unquestionably legitimate" reasoning. For that reason,
along with proposed congressional legislation that would grant greater au-
thority to states in the regulation of interstate alcohol, it appeared wine
69. 612 F.3d 809 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
70. See Steen, 612 F.3d at 811 ("We hold that the statutes do not run afoul of
the dormant Commerce Clause.").
71. See id. at 818-19 (noting that Granholm and North Dakota found three-tier
system to be "unquestionably legitimate"). The court, in direct language, empha-
sizes this importance by stating: "[T] he foundation on which we build is that Texas
may have a three-tier system." Id. at 819 (noting three-tier acceptability as starting
point for analysis). A major criticism of the petitioners, in their petition for writ of
certiorari, is that the Fifth Circuit (as well as the Second Circuit in Arnold's Wines)
began and ended its analysis with the aforementioned proposition, instead of ana-
lyzing the case under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 2, Steen, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (No. 10-671), 2010 WL 4735983 ("Rather than
construing Granholm as a prohibition ofdiscrimination, these courts have interpreted
that decision as a licensefor discrimination."). Similarly, an amici brief filed in sup-
port of the petitioners argued that the Fifth Circuit's decision was incorrect be-
cause, according to Granholm, a court can consider whether a regulation is saved by
the Twenty-first Amendment only after it has applied its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. See Brief for Economists, Law and Economics Scholars, and For-
mer FTC Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Steen, 131 S. Ct.
1602 (No. 10-671), 2010 WL 5388434 ("The Fifth Circuit erred in reading
Granholm as endorsing all three-tier systems as 'unquestionably legitimate,' even
those that discriminate against out-of-state shippers.").
72. See Steen, 612 F.3d at 820 (announcing narrow reading of Granholm as only
applicable to producers (wineries)).
73. See id. at 820 ("The dormant Commerce Clause applies, but it applies dif-
ferently than it does to products whose regulation is not authorized by a specific
constitutional amendment."). But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71,
at 11-12 ("But the court did not apply the Commerce Clause 'differently' in this
case; it did not apply the Commerce Clause at all.").
74. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 11 (determining
Texas's allowance for in-state local deliveries as constitutional).
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enthusiasts had no reason to celebrate.7 5 And then came Freeman v.
Corzine.76
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT BELLIES UP TO THE BAR IN Freeman v. Corzine
In the wake of Granholm and its circuit court progeny, the Third Cir-
cuit finally broke its silence on wine laws and issued the Freeman opinion in
December 2010.77 First, this Part tracks the path of Freeman through the
Third Circuit.7 8 Second, it provides a brief background of the parties and
the merits of the case.79 Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the
Third Circuit's ruling on each of the five issues presented.8 0
A. Allowing Granholm to Ferment: Freeman's Delay in Going to Court
As twisted as a grape vine was Freeman's path in arriving to the Third
Circuit. The case was originally filed as Freeman v. Fische?" in the Federal
District of New Jersey in 2003.82 The district court, however, administra-
tively terminated the case in light of the Supreme Court's acceptance of
Granholm v. Heald.83 The court left available the possibility to reopen the
case at a later date, should the plaintiffs not be satisfied with the result in
Granholm.8 4 Although Granholm addressed some of the plaintiffs' original
complaints, it did not address all of their grievances.85 Specifically, the
plaintiffs wished to challenge New Jersey's importation restrictions, reci-
procity laws, direct shipment ban of wine, and the statutory winery-retailer
75. See Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2010,
H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing legislation that would give greater
rights to states to regulate alcohol, and would significantly diminish role of dor-
mant Commerce Clause in alcohol law challenges).
76. For a discussion of Freeman v. Corzine, see infra notes 77-120 and accompa-
nying text.
77. See Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding all New
Jersey wine laws at issue, except for direct-shipping regulations, unconstitutional).
78. For a brief discussion on how Freeman made its way to the Third Circuit,
see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
79. For a background discussion of Freeman v. Corzine, see infra notes 89-98
and accompanying text.
80. For a summary of how the Third Circuit ruled on the issues facing the
court in Freeman v. Conine, see infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
81. 563 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D.N.J. 2008), affd in part, vacated in part, revd in part
sub nom., Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2010).
82. See Erin McAuley, New Jersey Liquor Laws May Be Unconstitutional, COURT-
HOUSE NEWS SERV., Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/12/22/
32828.htm (noting that plaintiffs originally filed suit in 2003).
83. See Fischer, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (noting that district court administra-
tively terminated original complaint, with leave to reopen proceedings, because
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Granholm).
84. See id. ("The Court administratively terminated the matter subject to the
parties' right to move to reopen the proceedings . . . .").
85. See id. at 496 (stating that plaintiffs specifically wished to challenge in-state
winery licensing structure that persisted after Granholm).
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laws that favored in-state wineries.86 Therefore, the court granted the
plaintiffs' request to reopen the case.87 In June 2008, the district court
issued an opinion that ruled in favor of the defendants on most, but not
all, of the issues.88 Dissatisfied with the ruling, both sides appealed to the
Third Circuit.89
B. Factual Background of Freeman v. Corzine
Freeman v. Corzine involved a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
two NewJersey oenophiles who challenged several NewJersey statutes that
limited their accessibility to different out-of-state wines.9 0 Three New
Jersey alcohol wholesalers joined the named defendant, New Jersey's Di-
rector of Alcoholic Beverage Control, who claimed that the challenged
laws were indisputably constitutional.9 1 The court addressed six issues on
appeal.9 2 The first issue involved a justiciability question: whether the
plaintiffs had standing to sue.93 The court determined they did.9 4 The
next five issues challenged the New Jersey regulations-the first two of
86. See id. at 499-500 (listing five issues plaintiffs identified with New Jersey
wine law that violated dormant Commerce Clause).
87. See id. at 497 (acknowledging that court granted request to reopen case).
88. See id. at 507 ("The Court concludes that only the licensing fee schedule
for out-of-state businesses . .. and the salesroom provision ... offend the dormant
commerce clause." (emphasis added)).
89. See Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that
although district court found challenged provisions to be mostly constitutional,
both parties appealed to circuit court).
90. See id. at 151 (summarizing parties involved and issues at bar in case).
There were two other groups of plaintiffs who joined in the case: a California win-
ery and a couple who sought greater access to Kosher wines. See id. (mentioning
other plaintiffs in case). However, because the court ends its standing analysis with
the Freemans, they serve as the principal party on the plaintiff side. See id. at 157
("[H]aving concluded that the Freemans possess both constitutional and pruden-
tial standing to raise all of the claims at issue, we do not consider the standing of
the other plaintiffs.").
91. See id. at 151-53 (noting NewJersey's Director of Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol as defendant, along with intervening wholesalers). It is not peculiar that the
wholesalers intervened in this case, given their interest in remaining within the
middle-tier of the three-tier system because of the amount of revenue derived from
that position. See Robert Taylor & Ben O'Donnell, Battle over Direct Shipping Heats
Up, WINE SPECTATOR, Aug. 31, 2010, at 19, available at http://www.freethegrapes.
com/sites/default/files/080110 _WineSpectator%20-_Battle OverDirect Ship-
ping-HeatsUp.pdf (noting amount of political contributions Wine and Spirits
Wholesalers of America, political action committee of wine wholesalers, has given
to members of Congress to support proposed legislation that would support whole-
saler role in alcohol distribution).
92. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 151-53 (noting standing and statutory issues
before court).
93. See id. at 154-57 (addressing "standing" issue). For a discussion of why the
court's treatment of the standing issue will make the Third Circuit a more appeala-
ble forum for future alcohol law challenges, see infra notes 138-41 and accompany-
ing text.
94. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 157 (determining that plaintiffs possess constitu-
tional and prudential standing). For a discussion of how the court determined
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which allowed in-state, but not out-of-state, wineries to sell their wines at
retail to customers.9 5 The third and fourth issues addressed New Jersey's
reciprocity and personal importation provisions.96 The final issue chal-
lenged NewJersey's prohibition on the direct shipment of alcohol. 9 7 The
plaintiffs thematically argued that all of the aforementioned restrictions
violated the dormant Commerce Clause by favoring in-state wineries over
their out-of-state counterparts.98 Conversely, the defendants argued that
the New Jersey laws were not discriminatory because they even-handedly
treated in- and out-of-state wineries. 9 9
C. Third Circuit Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
The Third Circuit began its analysis of the New Jersey provisions by
noting that the Commerce Clause "prohibits a state from impeding free
market forces to shield in-state business from out-of-state competition." 0 0
Applying this rationale, the NewJersey statutes fell in rapid succession.10
This section first addresses how the court invalidated New Jersey's retail
wine provisions. 102 Next, this section examines the court's analysis in
striking down the importation and reciprocity laws.10 3 Finally, this section
studies the Third Circuit's rationale in not striking down the direct ship-
ment ban.104
that the plaintiffs possessed prudential standing, see infra notes 138-41 and accom-
panying text.
95. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 158-60 (conducting analysis of first two statutory
provisions allowing in-state wineries to sell at retail to customers, but forbidding
out-of-state wineries from doing same).
96. See id. at 160-62 (discussing New Jersey's reciprocity provision and per-
sonal importation restriction of alcohol).
97. See id. at 162-63 (analyzing direct shipment ban challenge brought by
plaintiffs).
98. See id. at 151-52 (noting plaintiffs' challenge that NewJersey laws infringe
dormant Commerce Clause).
99. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Jerry Fischer and Vol-
ume One of Joint Appendix at 59, Freeman, 629 F.3d 146 (Nos. 08-3268, 08-3302),
2009 WL 7170547 (stating that NewJersey laws treat both in- and out-of-state enti-
ties similarly).
100. Freeman, 629 F.3d at 157-58 (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,
472 (2005)).
101. See id. at 158-62 (invalidating retail wine provisions, along with importa-
tion and reciprocity laws).
102. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in connection with New
Jersey's retail wine statute, see infta notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of the analysis pertaining to the importation and reci-
procity provisions, see infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
104. For an explanation of why the Third Circuit did not strike down New
Jersey's direct shipment ban, see infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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1. Selling Wine at Retail: A Win for the Dormant Commerce Clause
The court began its dormant Commerce Clause analysis by addressing
two New Jersey statutes focused on the retail sale of wine by wineries.1 0 5
The statutes at issue allowed NewJersey wineries to sell wine to consumers
on their premises and in "six salesrooms apart from the winery prem-
ises."10 6 In-state wineries were also afforded the benefit of selling directly
to retailers.10 7 The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the stat-
utes were non-discriminatory, declaring that the defendants' purported
"equal-handedness" was absent from NewJersey's direct-sales provision. 0 8
Judge Pollak, writing for the court, had no difficulty finding that the laws
were facially discriminatory, as New Jersey allowed in-state wineries to cir-
cumvent steps of the three-tier system, whereas out-of-state entities could
not.10 9 As such, the laws were subject to strict scrutiny analysis and subse-
quently failed the dormant Commerce Clause analysis due to the eco-
nomic benefit afforded to in-state wineries.1 10
2. Personal Importation and Reciprocity Laws: Discrimination Through
Limitation
The court then addressed NewJersey's personal importation and reci-
procity provisions."' First, the court noted that one of the challenged
statutes placed a one-gallon limit on the amount of wine that could be
105. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 158 ("We first consider plaintiffs' challenges to
the statutory provisions allowing only in-state wineries to sell directly to retailers
and consumers.").
106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-10(2a) (West 2008) ("The holder of this license
shall also have the right to sell such wine at retail in original packages in six sales-
rooms apart from the winery premises for consumption on or off the premises and
for sampling purposes for consumption on the premises . . . ."), invalidated by Free-
man, 629 F.3d 146; § 33:1-10(2b) (providing language with the same effect). The
difference between the two subsections of this statute pertains to the type of li-
cense that the producer holds: a plenary winery license (2a) or a farm winery li-
cense (2b). See id. (discussing different privileges that extend to separate licenses).
107. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 159-61 (addressing second discriminatory aspect
of New Jersey statute).
108. Id. at 159 (rejecting defendants' claim that New Jersey laws did not dis-
criminate). In rejecting the defendants' argument, the court distinguished Cherry
Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci. See id. (stating Baldacci does not support defendants'
argument). The court stated that Baldacci actually supports the Third Circuit's
analysis, contrary to the position of the defendants, because the Maine laws at issue
in Baldacci treated in- and out-of-state wineries equally. See id. ("Baldacci supports
our view that the direct-sale provisions of the ABC Law are facially
discriminatory.").
109. See id. ("Instate wineries are thereby allowed to skip the first two tiers-
wholesalers and retailers-while out-of-state wineries must involve both of these
tiers in order for their wine to reach consumers.").
110. See id. (noting that laws are subject to strict scrutiny because of their
facially discriminatory nature).
111. See id. at 160-61 (introducing analysis of personal importation and reci-
procity laws).
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personally imported into NewJersey from other states.11 2 As an exception
to the general rule, the statute permitted a transporting individual to ob-
tain and pay for a permit. 1 3 The court held that these requirements spe-
cifically burdened interstate commerce.1 14 Applying strict scrutiny, the
court held that the personal importation law violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause.' 15
In similar fashion, the court found that the reciprocity provision also
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.' 16 Section 33:1-2(a) prohibited
individuals from importing wine into New Jersey from an outside state,
unless the outside state also allowed New Jersey wines to be imported in
the same manner.' 17 The court refused to entertain the defendants' argu-
ment that the law did not pertain to wine imported for personal use.118
Furthermore, the court found the law to be facially discriminatory because
it allowed in-state wine to bypass portions of the three-tier system, whereas
out-of-state wine could not.119 Finally, it noted that the reciprocity provi-
sion "'risk[ed] generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances
112. See id. at 160 (discussing one-gallon cap on importation of out-of-state
wine); see also, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-2(a) (West 2008) ("Alcoholic beverages in-
tended in good faith solely for personal use may be transported, by the owner
thereof, in a vehicle other than that of the holder of a transportation license, from
a point outside this State to the extent of, not exceeding . .. one gallon of wine
."), invalidated by Freeman, 629 F.3d 146.
113. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 160-61 (discussing permit that allows wine in
excess of one gallon to be imported into state).
114. See id. at 160 ("Specifically, the requirements that any individual seeking
to enter New Jersey with a greater amount of wine (1) apply for a special permit,
and (2) pay a fee for the permit, directly burden interstate, but not intrastate,
commerce."). The court rejected the argument by defendants that the provision
served local purposes-taxation tracking and underage alcohol activities-that
could not be attained through non-discriminatory means. See id. (noting state's
argument). The court determined that no evidence existed in the record that
supported this argument, and that the district court lacked authority to raise the
issues sua sponte. See id. (explaining district court's error).
115. See id. at 160-61 (holding permit requirement violated dormant Com-
merce Clause).
116. See id. at 161 ("The reciprocity provision of § 33:1-2(a) also facially dis-
criminates against interstate commerce.").
117. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-2(a) ("[N]o person shall transport into this
State or receive from without this State into this State, alcoholic beverages where
the alcoholic beverages are transported or received from a state which prohibits
the transportation into that state of alcoholic beverages purchased or otherwise
obtained in the State of New Jersey.").
118. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 162 ("[T]he provision cannot be read to contain
an exception allowing importation for personal use, because to imply that excep-
tion would read the reciprocity clause out of the statute entirely.").
119. See id. at 161-62 (noting unequal treatment of in- and out-of-state winer-
ies with respect to three-tier system).
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and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce
Clause were designed to avoid."
12 0
3. The Direct Shipment Ban Survives
New Jersey's ban on the direct shipment of wine withstood dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.12' The plaintiffs argued that the law was dis-
criminatory in its effect because several out-of-state wineries only sold their
wine through direct shipments, as routing wine through a wholesaler was
not cost-effective. 122 The court, however, found that the Commerce
Clause does not place an obligation upon New Jersey to cater to the indi-
vidual business practices of out-of-state wineries.1 23 Moreover, the court
determined that the plaintiffs could not adequately show that NewJersey's
nondiscriminatory application of the direct shipment ban harmed inter-
state commerce by favoring intrastate commerce. 124 The court noted that
the plaintiffs did not argue that the "'burdens on interstate commerce
substantially outweigh[ed] the putative local benefits"' (the Pike balancing
test), and therefore upheld its constitutionality.1 25
IV. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CONNOISSEURS DELIGHT IN
THIRD CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT
In Freeman, the Third Circuit held that the dormant Commerce
Clause stood its ground with respect to alcohol law challenges.1 26 That
position, however, is notably different than that of some of its circuit coun-
120. Id. at 161 (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005)) (find-
ing New Jersey statute to be directly at odds with what Commerce Clause was de-
signed to prevent).
121. See id. at 164 ("[W]e reject [the plaintiffs'] challenge to the direct ship-
ping ban and affirm the District Court's opinion insofar as it held that ban to be
constitutional.").
122. See id. at 162-63 (arguing direct shipment ban discriminated in its effect
because some wineries only sell wine via direct shipment).
123. See id at 163 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that law was discriminatory
in its effect). The court referenced a 1999 Third Circuit opinion that held that
market structure and methods of operation of a business do not burden the Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 162-63 (recognizing that "'questions of the market's "struc-
ture" and its "method of operation" are quite simply beyond the concern of the
Commerce Clause"' (quoting A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. N.J. Bureau of Secs., 163 F.3d
780, 787 (3d Cir. 1999))).
124. See id. at 163 (acknowledging plaintiffs' failure to show direct link be-
tween New Jersey law and burden on interstate commerce).
125. Id. at 157-58 (quoting Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk
Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 239, 258 (3d Cir. 2006)) (discussing Pike balancing test); see
also id. at 164 (noting that plaintiffs neglected to argue in alternative that direct
shipment ban failed Pike balancing test).
126. See id. at 164-65 ("[W]e ... reverse the District Court's determination
that the direct sales and importation provisions of NewJersey law comport with the
dictates of the dormant Commerce Clause . . . .").
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terparts.127 This Part will examine the Third Circuit's dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, focusing on how it differs from that of other circuit
courts-namely, the Fifth Circuit in Steen. 128 Next, this Part will offer ad-
vice for practitioners wishing to challenge outstanding wine laws, specifi-
cally addressing why the Third Circuit is the forum of choice for such
suits.129 Finally, this Part will discuss possible arguments for wine law
defenders.13 0
A. A Critical Analysis of Freeman
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Freeman by focusing on the
dormant Commerce Clause, unlike the court in Steen, which focused on
the "unquestionably legitimate" three-tier system.' 3 ' The distinction be-
tween how these two starting points cannot be overstated, for it is what
drove the difference in the outcomes of Freeman and Steen.1 12 The Fifth
Circuit's analysis focused on the text of the Twenty-first Amendment-
granting states the power to regulate alcohol shipment across state lines-
especially in relation to the "unquestionably legitimate" language in
Granholm and North Dakota.'33 In sharp contrast, the Third Circuit placed
the dormant Commerce Clause beyond the reach of the Twenty-first
Amendment by acknowledging, through Granholm's precedential holding
127. See, e.g., Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir.
2010) (holding local deliveries of alcohol by in-state, but not out-of-state, retailers
does not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571
F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding direct shipment of alcohol by in-state retailers
did not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v.
Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that Maine statute allowing in-state
wineries to by-pass wholesalers and sell directly to consumers did not violate dor-
mant Commerce Clause); Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
personal importation exceptions do not violate dormant Commerce Clause).
128. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
129. Advice for practitioners who may challenge wine laws in the Third Cir-
cuit may be found infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of possible arguments in defense of state wine laws, see
infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
131. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 157 (noting that proper analysis of alcohol law
challenges is to be conducted through prism of Commerce Clause); see also Steen,
612 F.3d at 820-21 (discussing court's reliance on three-tier system being
legitimate).
132. See generally Mike Figge, Note, Constitutional Law-Challenging Anti-com-
merce State Regulatory Schemes in Light of the Supreme Court's Admonition of Protectionist
Alcohol Regulations; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), 8 Wyo. L. REv. 231,
249-58 (2008) (discussing difficulties in application of Supreme Court's Granholm
holding due to tension between dormant Commerce Clause analysis and "unques-
tionably legitimate" description of three-tier system).
133. See Steen, 612 F.3d at 818 ("When analyzing what else is invalid under the
Supreme Court's Granholm reasoning, we find direction in a source for some of the
Court's language. The Court quoted a 1986 precedent that North Dakota's three-
tier system was 'unquestionably legitimate."' (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005))).
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that "dormant Commerce Clause principles apply in the context of regula-
tions on the shipment of wine."1 3 4
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from forming eco-
nomic trade barriers, irrespective of the good being sold.13 5 The Third
Circuit's emphasis of this point, buttressed by the support of the Supreme
Court's acknowledgement in Granholm that any laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce are invalid in "all but the narrowest of circum-
stances," is the decisive difference between Freeman and Steen.'3 6 The Free-
man court is clear in its position that economic discrimination is allowable
only when a state meets the sufficient criteria of a legitimate local purpose
that could not be achieved through non-discriminatory means.' 3 7 Simi-
larly, the Third Circuit does not distort the Granholm precedent by limiting
it to alcohol producers; economic discrimination may occur at any level of
the three-tier system.13 8 The Third Circuit rooted its analysis in the princi-
ples of the dormant Commerce Clause-protection of economic free-
dom-without overextending the reach of the Twenty-first Amendment,
which was the notable error in Steen.13 9
It may be possible, however, to reconcile the outcome in Steen by way
of the Third Circuit's analysis in Freeman. In Steen, the court focused on
134. Freeman, 629 F.3d at 158 (noting that dormant Commerce Clause applies
to alcohol regulation).
135. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486-87 (noting that § 2 of Twenty-first Amend-
ment does not save laws of other constitutional provisions, nor does it abrogate
Congress's Commerce Clause power). But see Harris Danow, Recent Development,
History Turned "Sideways": Granholm v. Heald and the Twenty-first Amendment, 23
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 761, 768-69 (2006) (arguing that history behind Twenty-
first Amendment makes it clear that "alcohol was not to be regarded as just an-
other ordinary article of commerce"). For an interesting discussion on the history
of the dormant Commerce Clause's application to alcohol laws, and an argument
that except for Prohibition, courts have always treated alcohol like any other good
under the Commerce Clause, see Figge, supra note 132, at 235-43 (arguing that
Commerce Clause pendulum is swinging back in favor of holding alcohol laws
unconstitutional).
136. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (noting that state laws almost always violate
Commerce Clause if laws benefit in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests).
137. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 158 (stating that if plaintiff shows challenged law
to be discriminatory, "'the State must demonstrate (1) that the statute serves a
legitimate local interest, and (2) that this purpose could not be served as well by
available nondiscriminatory means'" (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman,
437 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2006))). This is consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent, which uses the same test to determine whether an economically discrimina-
tory law may still be constitutional. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (completing
analysis of Michigan and New York laws to determine constitutionality).
138. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 160 (implying that economic discrimination
could occur at wholesaler level via purchase of wholesaler permits by out-of-state
wineries due to discriminatory permit fee and continued subjection to three-tier
system).
139. See generally Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 31, at 648-49 (discussing
detrimental effect of relying on Twenty-first Amendment for justification in dis-
criminatory state alcohol laws).
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the legitimacy of the three-tier system via Granholm's "unquestionably legit-
imate" language. 140 By applying more of a dormant Commerce Clause-
centric analysis, the Fifth Circuit could have emphasized the non-discrimi-
natory nature of the Texas law with respect to its treatment of alcohol
passing through the three-tier system.14 This reasoning abandons a heavy
reliance on the "unquestionably legitimate" reasoning, and instead
grounds its analysis in a constitutional blend: respect for states' rights
under the Twenty-first Amendment through the lens of the dormant Com-
merce Clause.14 2 Of course, a challenger's next step would be to attack
the final discriminatory stage of the delivery process, which is exactly why
Steen was on petition to the Supreme Court.14 3
B. A Practitioner's Guide to Wine Suits in the Third Circuit
1. Advice for the Wine Law Challenger: Get into Pike
For practitioners wishing to challenge alcohol laws, there may be no
better forum in which to bring a suit than the Third Circuit. In Freeman,
the Third Circuit addressed for the first time whether plaintiffs have pru-
dential standing if they are not directly regulated by the challenged stat-
ute.144 The court held that such a class of plaintiffs do have prudential
standing "if their 'ability to freely contract with out-of-state companies [is]
directly infringed by local regulation.'" 45 This position, in effect, throws
open the courthouse doors to plaintiffs indirectly injured through their
inability to contract with alcohol producers directly regulated by state
140. See Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 819 (5th Cir.
2010) ("[T]he foundation on which we build is that Texas may have a three-tier
system."); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 11-12 ("[T]he
court did not apply the Commerce clause 'differently' in this case; it did not apply
the Commerce Clause at all. The court sought tojustify this approach by invoking
Granholm's observation that 'the three-tier system is "unquestionably legitimate."'"
(quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489)).
141. Cf Freeman, 629 F.3d at 158-64 (applying dormant Commerce Clause
analysis in determining constitutionality of New Jersey law).
142. See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332
(1964) (discussing relationship between Twenty-first Amendment and Commerce
Clause). In explaining this relationship, the Supreme Court stated, "Both the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Consti-
tution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the
light of the other. . . ." Id.
143. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 19 (discussing direct
shipment of alcohol by Texas retailers), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
144. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 156-57 (noting that Third Circuit has never an-
swered question of whether plaintiffs have prudential standing when not directly
regulated by statute).
145. Id. at 157 (quoting Oxford Assocs. v. Waste Sys. Auth. of E. Montgomery
Cnty., 271 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2001)) (Barry, J., dissenting). The court noted
that it was adopting the rle out of the interest that the plaintiffs had in "vindi-
cat[ing] interests related to the protection of interstate commerce." Id.
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laws.146 Although not the only circuit to find prudential standing in such
a scenario, the Third Circuit's standing position, coupled with its dormant
Commerce Clause application to wine challenges, does make it an ideal
forum for alcohol law challengers.' 4 7
Besides grounding any alcohol law challenge in the Commerce
Clause, practitioners would also be wise to argue in the alternative that
challenged laws, even if not discriminatory, fail the Pike balancing test.148
This is particularly important for direct shipment ban challenges.' 4 9 Be-
cause current direct shipment bans are largely facially nondiscrimina-
tory-meaning they apply to both in- and out-of-state suppliers
evenhandedly-there is not a convenient "exception to the three-tier sys-
tem" argument that will elevate the ban into a strict scrutiny category.' 50
Therefore, practitioners bringing such a challenge must provide concrete
146. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221,
251-53 (1988) (discussing prudential standing as applied by federal courts). As
Professor Fletcher explains, courts use prudential standing to determine whether a
plaintiff has a recognizable cause of action. See id. (noting function of prudential
standing among courts). Therefore, expanding prudential standing to a class of
plaintiffs not directly, but indirectly, injured through a relationship with a third
party will allow more litigation to reach the merits of the case. See id. at 246 (dis-
cussing third-party standing cases).
147. See, e.g., Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren Cnty., 214 F.3d 707, 710-12
(6th Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiff met requirement for prudential standing in con-
tracting with affected third party). But see Ben Oehrleins & Sons and Daughter,
Inc. v. Hennepin Cnty., 115 F.3d 1372, 1381 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding no prudential
standing for generators of waste who incurred higher removal costs due to county
ordinance that increased cost of waste removal hauling company).
148. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating test used
to determine whether nondiscriminatory statute impermissibly burdens interstate
commerce). In Pike, Justice Stewart stated what is now known as the "Pike balanc-
ing test":
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affect-
ing interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that
emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser im-
pact on interstate activities.
Id. (citations omitted).
149. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 164 (noting failure to argue Pike balancing test
with respect to New Jersey's direct shipment ban). Specifically, the Freeman court
noted: "Because plaintiffs do not argue in the alternative that the direct shipping
ban fails the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., we reject their challenge to
the direct shipping ban and affirm the District Court's opinion insofar as it held
that ban to be constitutional." Id. (citation omitted).
150. See Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 48, at 512-16 (discussing response by
states with discriminatory wine laws in wake of Granholm ruling); see also id. at 526-
27 (discussing availability of Pike balancing test argument in challenging nondis-
criminatory alcohol laws).
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evidence that the challenged state law places "burdens on interstate com-
merce [that] substantially outweigh[ ] the putative local benefits."1 5 As
the court hinted in Freeman, the Pike balancing test argument may very well
be the chink in the armor of the direct shipment ban and other existing
alcohol laws.' 5 2
2. Advice to Defenders: Embrace the Legitimate Local Purpose
The defendants in Freeman missed an opportunity to "save the provi-
sions of the ABC law" by failing to provide an argument that the regula-
tions served a legitimate local purpose.' 5 3 Although this is not an easy
argument to make, as Supreme Court and circuit court precedent both
demonstrate, it is worth exploring. 1 5  The "legitimate local purpose" ar-
gument failed throughout the courts in its previous attempts because de-
fendants failed to show a concrete correlation between the law and the
local purpose it served.15 5 More correlative evidence could possibly rem-
edy that defect.15 6 Furthermore, a watchful eye should be kept on the
other circuits and how they treat the "unquestionably legitimate" rationale
expressed in Steen.157 Should that gain traction amongst the circuits, a
different Third Circuit bench could lend that argument more
151. Freeman, 629 F.3d at 157-58 (discussing purpose of applying Pike balanc-
ing test when plaintiff does not show that challenged law is discriminatory (quot-
ing Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 258
(3d Cir. 2006))).
152. See id. at 164 (noting no Pike argument was made).
153. Id. at 160 (noting that defendants did not argue that provisions of ABC
law were necessary to serve legitimate local purpose). Further in its analysis, the
court noted that the defendants also failed to argue a legitimate local purpose for
the reciprocity provision. See id. at 162 ("[N]o party has provided us with any argu-
ment that the reciprocity provision is necessary to effectuate some legitimate local
interest.").
154. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489-93 (2005) (rejecting
states' arguments that laws served legitimate local purpose in preventing underage
drinking and fostering tax accountability); Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins,
592 F.3d 1, 17 n.23 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting Massachusetts' claim that state law
served state law served local purposes of "benefitting small wineries, supporting the
three-tier system, and increasing consumer choice"); Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v.
Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendants' argument that
Kentucky laws were necessary to police underage drinking and to account for tax
revenue).
155. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492-93 ("The Court has upheld state regula-
tions that discriminate against interstate commerce only after finding, based on con-
crete record evidence, that a State's nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove
unworkable." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
156. See id. at 492 ("Our Commerce Clause cases demand more than mere
speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods.").
157. See Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 818-21 (5th
Cir. 2010) (holding Texas law constitutional due to state's unquestionably legiti-
mate three-tier system). For a discussion of other circuit courts that have upheld
the "unquestionably legitimate" argument in favor of state laws surviving a dor-
mant Commerce Clause challenge, see supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
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credence.15 8 Finally, there is always a remedy to such challenges through
the dormant Commerce Clause "exception"-congressional approval to
discriminate in interstate commerce-an option currently proposed by
some elected representatives, albeit without much success.' 5 9
V. NEW JERSEY's HARVEST: WHAT LIES AHEAD?
So what does the future hold for New Jersey wineries?' 6 0 The Third
Circuit remanded Freeman to the district court for a remedy, which has
many NewJersey wineries concerned that the court could mandate that in-
state wineries cease selling wine directly to consumers.1 6 1 The District
Court should, and probably will, find this option undesirable, as it will
impede current state economic conditions.1 62 In fact, a bill is currently
being drafted that would allow both in- and out-of-state wineries to ship
158. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 151 (noting case was heard before a three-judge
panel).
159. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946) (explaining
that state may engage in discriminatory economic regulation if Congress has "ex-
pressly stated its intent and policy" to allow state to do so). In a later case, justice
White explained the rationale behind allowing a state to engage in interstate eco-
nomic discrimination when he stated:
On the other hand, when Congress acts, all segments of the country are
represented, and there is significantly less danger that one State will be in
a position to exploit others. Furthermore, if a State is in such a position,
the decision to allow it is a collective one. A rule requiring a clear expres-
sion of approval by Congress ensures that there is, in fact, such a collec-
tive decision and reduces significantly the risk that unrepresented
interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce.
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984) (explaining
exception to dormant Commerce Clause); see also Robert Taylor, Congress Holds
Hearing on Bill Threatening Wine Direct Shipping, WINE SPECTATOR, Sep. 30, 2010,
http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/43670 (discussing Congres-
sional hearing on H.R. 5034 proposal that would return greater power to states to
regulate alcohol).
160. For a discussion of the future for NewJersey wineries, see infra notes 161-
64 and accompanying text.
161. See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 164 (discussing possible remedies and ultimately
remanding case to district court for determination); see also Editorial, New Jersey's
Wine Industry / Could It Dry Up?, PRESS OF AnLAnrc Crry, Feb. 3, 2011, (discussing
concern in New Jersey that court could order wineries to cease selling to consum-
ers); Paul Nussbaum, Wineries in N.J. Say Court May Sour Sales, PuiLA. INQUIRER, Jan.
30, 2011, available at http://articles.philly.com/2011-01-30/news/27091304_1_di-
rect-shipping-discriminates-against-out-of-state-wineries-new-jersey-legislature (dis-
cussing ramifications if district court chooses to ban direct sales by New Jersey
wineries).
162. See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 738, 792
(2010) (arguing that courts, when faced with decision of expansion or contraction
of benefit for remedy, should favor "a national-market norm"). Professor Walsh,
in his article, proposed a scenario very similar to the situation that existed in Free-
man. See id. at 791 (describing state system that allowed in-state wineries to ship
directly to customers, but required out-of-state wineries to pass product through
wholesalers). Professor Walsh argues that in such a situation, the remedy a court
should choose would be to expand the direct-shipping benefit instead, favoring
the economic system, than look to the "unexpressed legislative purpose" of a state
7772012] CASEBRIEF
25
Williamson: Raise Your Glass: The Third Circuit Holds New Jersey Wine Laws in
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
778 VILLANOvA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: p. 753
directly to customers.1 63 Despite the cloudy final disposition for New
Jersey wineries, one thing remains clear: as the Freeman decision decants,
the tannins that have preserved the dormant Commerce Clause's prowess
in the Third Circuit have given wine enthusiasts reason to toast, as direct-
shipping restrictions now appear ripe for a challenge.16 4
legislature. Id. at 791 (explaining national-market constitutional norm application
to direct-shipping scenario).
163. See Robert Taylor, Direct Shipping Coming Soon to NewJersey?, WINE SPECTA-
TOR, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/44362
("Wine Spectator has learned that local wineries are working with state legislators to
craft a bill that would allow shipping by both in-state and out-of-state wineries.").
164. See id. ("To save the [NewJersey] satellite tasting rooms-and the New
Jersey wine industry itself-members of the Garden State Wine Growers Associa-
tion have banded together to propose a remedy: Legalize [sic] direct shipping.").
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